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Abstract. I consider economic environments involving externalities and public goods 
where agents have full information but the regulator does not. For these environments I 
present a class of simple two-stage games whose subgame perfect equilibria axe efficient 
allocations. In the case of two-party externalities, the equilibria involve compensation for 
the party upon whom the externality is inflicted. In the case of public goods, the equilibria 
are Lindahl allocations.
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A Solution to the Problem of Externalities and Public Goods 
when Agents are Well-Informed.
Hal R. Varian
Consider an economic environment in which some agents may take actions which impose 
benefits or costs on other agents. All agents are aware of the relevant technology and 
the tastes of all other agents. However the “regulator,” who has the responsibility for 
determining the final allocation, does not have this information. How can the regulator 
design a mechanism so that the agents will have the proper incentives to reveal their 
information and achieve an efficient allocation?
In addition to implementing an efficient allocation, one might also want the mechanism 
to achieve some distributional goals. For example, one might want agents who are injured 
by an externality to be compensated for that injury. Or, in the case of public goods, one 
might want the public goods to be paid for by a system of Lindahl taxes.
In this paper I describe a simple two-stage game that implements efficient allocations 
in this sort of environment. The mechanism also achieves the distributional goals just 
described. In the subgame perfect equilibria of this game, parties injured by the externality 
are compensated and in the case of public goods, the mechanism implements Lindahl 
allocations. The mechanism appears to work in a broad variety of economic environments 
and does not involve substantial restrictions on tastes or technology. In addition, the 
mechanism is very simple to describe and analyze.
The fact that sequential games and subgame perfect equilibria may be very useful in 
implementation problems was first suggested by Moore and Repullo (1988). They show 
that in economic environments, almost any choice rule can be implemented by subgame 
perfect equilibria. However, as Moore and Repullo point out, “ . . .  the mechanisms we con­
struct . . .  are far from simple; agents move simultaneously at each stage and their strategy
This work was supported by National Science Foundation grant SES-8800114. I wish to thank Mark 





























































































sets are unconvincingly rich. We present such mechanisms to show what is possible, not 
what is realistic.” (p. 1198)
However, Moore and Repullo also show that in certain “economic environments” it is 
possible to use somewhat simpler mechanisms. I pursue this idea and construct mechanisms 
that appear to be quite simple and practical for the sorts of the externality problems of 
interest to economists.
It should be emphasized that these mechanisms only work in the case where the agents 
are perfectly informed about the technology and tastes of the other agents. This is, of 
course, more restrictive than one would like. However, there is a broad set of cases for 
which such mechanisms may be useful. For example, consider a set of agents who must 
design a mechanism to make group decisions in situations that will arise in the future. 
At the time the mechanism is chosen, the agents do not know the relevant tastes and 
technologies, but they will know these things when the mechanism is actually used.
This latter example is sometimes known as a “constitutional choice” problem: we 
must choose a decision-making procedure without knowing much about the tastes and 
technologies available to the agents who will use the procedure. However, we do know 
that the agents who will actually use the procedure will be reasonably well-informed about 
these matters when the decision must be made. I suggest that the mechanism described 
below may be useful for such problems.
In section 1 I describe a very simple example of the mechanism in a two-firm exter­
nalities problem and discuss in an intuitive way why the method works. The following 
sections show how the method can be extended to work in more general environments. 
Next, I describe a generalization of the mechanism which implements Lindahl allocations 
in a standard public goods problem. Finally, I show how the method may be used to solve 
very general problems in resource allocation.
1. An example of the mechanism
Consider the following externality problem involving two firms. Firm 1 produces output x 
in order to maximize its profit




























































































Here r is the competitive price of output and the cost function c(x) is a differentiable, 
positive, increasing, and convex function.
We assume that firm l ’s choice of output imposes an externality on firm 2. For any 
choice of x, firm 2’s profits are
x2 =  —e(x),
where e(x) is a differentiable, positive, increasing, and convex function of x. All of this 
information is common knowledge among the agents, but is not known to the regulator.
One class of solutions to this externality problem involves re-assigning the property 
rights. For example, one firm could buy out the other, internalize the externality, and 
eliminate the inefficiency. Another class of solutions involves negotiation between the 
agents with respect to the externality. A third class of solutions involves intervention by 
a regulator who imposes a Pigouvian tax.
We will assume that the property rights are fixed, so that one firm cannot buy out 
the other or move away from the externality. Hence “property rights” solutions to the 
externality are not available and some type of negotiation between the firms or intervention 
by the regulator is necessary to encourage efficient outcomes.
If the regulator had full information the problem would be easy. One solution would 
be for the regualtor to impose the costs of the externality on firm 1 by charging it a “tax” 
of e(x) if it produces x units of output. Firm 1 would then solve the problem
max rx — c(x) — e(x).
Let x* be solution to this problem; then x* satisfies the first-order condition
r — c'(x*) — e '(x ')  -  0.
Given our curvature assumptions on e(x), we could just as well set a “Pigouvian tax,” 
p* =  e '(x ')  and let firm 1 solve the problem
max rx — c(x) -  p*x.
However, we have assumed that the regulator doesn’t know the size of the externality 




























































































will induce the agents to reveal their information about the magnitude of the externality 
and achieve an effient level of production.
Here is a mechanism that solves the regulator’s problem.
Announcement stage. Firm 1 and firm 2 simultaneously announce the magnitude of the 
appropriate Pigouvian tax; denote the announcement of firm 1 by p i and the announcement 
of firm 2 by p2.
Production stage. Firm 1 chooses x to maximize the following payoff 
n j =  px -  c(x) -  p2x -  Oi(p! -  p2)2.
Firm 2 receives a payoff of
n 2 =P\x - e ( x )  - o2(P2 -  Pi )2-
The parameters a\ and « 2 are arbitrary positive numbers.
In this mechanism firm 1 is forced to pay a penalty based on the marginal social cost 
of the externality as reported by firm 2, and firm 2 receives compensation based on the 
marginal social cost as reported by firm 1. Each firm must also pay a penalty based on 
the square of the difference between the two reports. This penalty can be any increasing 
function of difference between the two reports, but we have chosen a quadratic penalty for 
simplicity. Since the a ’s can be arbitrary positive constant, the penalties can be arbitrarily 
small.
Analysis of the mechanism
There are many Nash equilibria of this game; essentially any triple (pi,P2 ,x ) such that 
Pi =  P2 and x maximizes firm l ’s objective function is a Nash equilibrium. However, if 
we use the stronger concept of subgame perfect equilibrium we get a much smaller set of 
equilibria. In fact, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of this game has each agent 




























































































In order to verify this, we must work backwards through the game. We begin with the 
production stage. Firm 1 maximizes its profits, given the reports generated in stage 1, 
which implies that firm 1 will choose x to satisfy the first-order condition
r =  c '(x ) + P 2 -
This determines the optimal choice, x, as a function of p2, which we denote by x(p2). Note 
that x,(p2) <  0—the higher the cost that firm 2 announces, the less firm 1 will want to 
produce.
We now examine the price-setting stage of the game. Consider first firm 1. If firm 1 
believes that firm 2 will announce p2, then firm 1 will want to announce pi =  p2. This is 
clear since P\ has no effect on firm l ’s payoff except through the quadratic penalty.
Consider now firm 2’s decision. Although firm 2’s announcement has no direct effect 
on firm 2’s profits, it does have an indirect effect through the influence of p2 on firm l ’s 
output choice in stage 2. Differentiating the profit function of firm 2 with respect to p2, 
we have
n2(p2) = [pi -  e'(x)]x'(p2) ~ 2o2(p2 -  pi). ( 1 )
We have seen that pi =  p2 in equilibrium. Hence if firm 2 is at an interior equilibrium we 
must have pj =  e'(x).
The second derivative of firm 2’s profit is
n !>(P2) =  [Pi ~  e'(*)]*"(P2 ) -  z'(P2)2e"(x) -  2o2 < 0.
Here we have used the fact that p2 =  e'(x) and x'(p2) <  0. Hence the second-order 
condition must be satisfied at any interior solution.
If pi =  e'(x), then the first order condition for production is
r =  c '(x ) +  e'(x),
which is simply the condition for social optimality. Hence, the unique subgame perfect 
equilibrium to this game involves firm 1 producing the socially optimal amount of the 
externality. Note that this is a strict equilibrium in the sense that each firm’s maximization 




























































































The only thing remaining to check is that there are no boundary solutions. Suppose 
that p can range between zero and p. Since p\ =  P2 in any equilibrium, the derivative of 
firm 2’s profit at P2 =  0 is
n^(0) = —e'(x)x'(0) > 0.
Similarly, at P2 =  p, we have
n ^ p ) =  [p -  e'(*)]*'(p)-
If p is larger than the largest possible marginal externality cost, this derivative will certainly 
be negative.
Note that in this mechanism, firm 2 is compensated for the externality. Since the 
externality cost function is convex, firm 2 in fact is overcompensated for the externality, in 
the sense that the amount of money it collects exceeds the cost of the externality.
2. Discussion of the example
The intuition behind the mechanism is not particularly difficult. In the first stage each 
firm announces the (marginal) cost of the externality: firm 1 announces a cost that will 
be used to compensate firm 2, and firm 2 announces a cost that will be used to tax firm 1.
It is more or less obvious that firm 1 will never want to say the externality is not as 
costly as it really is, since then firm 2 will then want to set a large tax for firm 1 so as to 
make the level of production as small as possible. This will certainly harm firm 1.
Will firm 1 will ever want to overstate the cost of the externality by announcing that 
the externality is larger than it really is? If it does, the firm 2 will be overcompensated 
on the margin and will want set p2 =  0 so that firm 1 will produce as much output as 
possible. But then firm 1 will have to pay a penalty based on the difference between their 





























































































We have seen that each firm independently has an incentive to reveal the truth in equilib­
rium. Furthermore, in equilibrium the government’s budget balances in the sense that the 
compensation paid to firm 2 is just equal to the tax paid by firm 1. But out of equilibrium 
the budget will not necessarily balance. Is it possible that the two firms can collude in 
some way so as to exploit the regulator?
The sum of the profits of the two firms using the mechanism is:
{r +  Pi - P i ) x  -  c(x) -  e(x) -  (<*1 +  o 2)(pi - p 2)2- (2)
Ignore the quadratic penalty term in (2) for the moment. Then without this term, the 
firms would like to set pj =  p and l>2 — 0. That is, firm 1 would want to exaggerate the 
magnitude of the externality in order to encourage the regulator to pay a large compensa­
tion to firm 2. But if firm 2 gets overcompensated for the externality, it wants to report 
p2 =  0 so as to encourage firm 1 to produce as much as possible.
However, this strategy involves making highly divergent reports. Can we use the 
penalty term to discourage such collusion?
The quadratic penalty is not very good for this purpose since it has a derivative of zero 
when pi =  p2. However an absolute value penalty works reasonably well. To see this, let 
the penalty term be given by a, |pi — P2 1- If we choose a 2 — 0 the proof given earlier goes 
through: pi =  P2 is still the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the game.
Suppose that we consider increasing pi and decreasing p2. Then the profits of the firm 
increase by x, and the penalty increases by oq. Certainly for large enough values of a 1 
this will not be a profitable move for the coalition.
Strict equilibria and information costs
We have assumed that each firm has full information. It is natural to suppose that firm 2 
knows the cost of the externality, but firm 1 may not know the magnitude of the costs it 
imposes, at least with certainty. However, let us suppose that firm 1 may learn the size of 
the externality by incurring some costs. The question is, will firm 1 have proper incentives 




























































































Without modeling the information acquisition in detail we cannot give a precise answer 
to this question. However, roughly speaking, it appears that the answer is yes. Since the 
efficient output is a strict equilibrium, firm 1 incurs a penalty if it announces pi /  p2. The 
size of this penalty depends on the magnitude of the aq. The larger the value of oi\ the 
more incentive firm 1 has to match firm 2’s announcement. Hence, firm 2 does have an 
incentive to invest in information acquisition.
Income effects
The above example used payoff functions that are linear in money, so that the objective 
functions of the agents are quasilinear utility functions. This is reasonable in the case of 
firm behavior, but somewhat restrictive in the case of externalities involving consumers.
However, the mechanism can easily be generalized to include income effects. Since 
this is a special case of the public goods problem and general resource allocation problem 
presented later, we defer the argument until we treat those topics.
3. Relation to the literature
There is a broad literature that is concerned with the design of games to implement 
desired allocations. See Laffont and Maskin (1982) and Maskin (1985) for overviews of 
this literature. There are three crucial aspects in the mechanism described above: first, 
that agents report on the type of other agents, second, that there is a penalty based on 
the difference in the reports, and third, that we use subgame perfection as an equilibrium 
concept.
Each of these features has appeared in other mechanisms available in the literature, 
but, to my knowledge, they have never been used together in the same way that I use them. 
For example, Matsushima (1988) and Palfrey and Srivastava (1989) describe mechanism 
where agents report on each others type. Each of these mechanisms involves penalties 
when the types are different.
Moore and Repullo (1989) use all three devices in their basic mechanism, but the 
mechanism is very complex. It is however, designed for more general problems than simply 






























































































The externality described above is a very simple one: there are only two agents involved. 
It might be supposed that if property rights can be freely transferred, or other sort of 
negotiations can be undertaken, then it would be possible to internalize simple two-party 
externalities of this sort. The vast literature on the Coase theorem discusses this point in 
detail.
But problems involving several agents are not so easily dismissed. If the externality 
is a public good, then transferring property rights may be difficult or impossible. And 
totally unstructured negotiations may be very complex or costly to implement. However, 
a generalization of our mechanism may still be used effectively. We loosely describe the 
mechanism here, and give a more detailed description in the next section.
In the case of public goods, the relevant parameter for describing the tastes of an agent 
is simply his Lindahl price— his marginal rate of substitution at a particular Pareto efficient 
allocation. In stage 1 of our game, each agent i will simultaneously announce a “price of 
the public good,” pij, for each other agent j .  The “price” that agent j  will actually face 
is the average of the prices chosen for him by the other agents.
In the second stage of the game, each agent j  determines how much he wants to 
contribute to the public good based on his personalized price determined in the first stage 
of the game. The amount that each agent has to pay for his contribution will depend on 
his own contribution and on the total contributions by the other agents.
Agents recognize in the first stage that the prices that they set will influence the Nash 
equilibrium of the contribution game in the second stage. We will show that in the unique 
subgame perfect equilibrium, each agent will announce a set of Lindahl prices, and the 
Contributions in the second stage will comprise the associated Lindahl allocation!
5. A simple mechanism for the public goods problem
There are n agents and two goods, a private good, x,, and a public good, G. Agent i has 
a differentiable quasiconcave utility function u,(G, x ,) and initial wealth w,. We assume 
that the demand function for the public good is a differentiable function of its price; see 




























































































A unit of the private good can be transformed into a unit of the public good on a 
one-for-one basis. Hence if each agent j  sacrifices gj o f the private good, the utility of 
agent i will be u , ( , gj,Wi — g,)- This is not a serious restriction on the technology that
generates the public good. If G is produced from the private good by a concave production 
function h{x), then the utility function of agent i is “ i(^CCj=i 9 i)iw■ — 9i)i which simply 
involves reinterpreting the original utility function.
A Lindahl allocation for this problem is a set of personalized prices (p‘ ) for the public 
good, such that the amount of the public good that each consumer i demands at his 
personalized price is equal to a Pareto efficient amount of the public good. Since a Pareto 
efficient amount of the public good satisfies the Samuelson condition that the sum of the 
marginal rates of substitution equals the marginal cost, we must have Pi — 1- 
Our mechanism for solving this public goods problem consists of two stages.
The price setting stage. Each agent i announces n — 1 numbers for all j  -/: i. The 
personalized price facing agent j  is the average of the numbers named by the other agents:
Let p denote the vector of prices (p\,. . . ,  p„).
The contribution stage. Each agent i chooses a nonnegative amount <jq to contribute to 
the public good. If the total amount of contributions equals G, then agent i must pay an 
amount piG +  Q(p), where Q(p) =  — l ) I 2 and a is an arbitrary (small) positive
constant.
I claim that the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of this game will be a Lindahl 
allocation.
It is easy to show that the Lindahl allocation is an equilibrium of this game. To do 
this we only need to show that if every other agent announces the Lindahl prices, agent i 
can not increase his utility by announcing some other set of prices.
To prove this we first observe that since the Lindahl prices generate an efficient amount 




























































































that agent i , say, announces some numbers that change the price vector pe to p' and that 
this change results in some possibly different amount of the public good, G'. Note that 
the price facing agent i does not change since agent i can only affect the prices facing the 
other agents.
We have
u.(Ge, wi -  p 'G ')  >  u,(G\ wi -  p 'G ') >  u,(G ', Wi -  p 'G ' -  <%>')).
The first inequality arises from the fact that we start with a Lindahl allocation so that 
agent i ’s demand for the public good at his personalized price is the actual amount of the 
public good. The second inequality arises from the fact that Q(p') >  0. This shows that 
agent i is at least as well off announcing numbers that lead to the Lindahl prices (pp  as 
any other numbers.
The proof that there are no other subgame perfect equilibria to the game is somewhat 
more complicated and is given in the next section. However, it is worthwhile giving an 
intuitive argument here to get a feel for the mechanism. In order to do this we make the 
strong assumption that each agent contributes a positive amount in the second stage of 
the game. This will not generally be true, and dealing with this difficulty is what generates 
the complications in the formal proof given below.
Let pi be an arbitrary set of prices that do not sum to 1. In the first stage of the game 
agent i gets to influence agent j ’s price, pj. We will show that agent i can change pj in a 
way that will increase agent i ’s utility.
The derivative of agent i ’s utility with respect to pj is
dui _  dui dG dui
dpj dG dpj dx, V j = i
Since by assumption agent i is contributing a positive amount in the contribution stage 
of the game,
dui dui 
dG dxiP i~ ° '

































































































Hence agent i can always change pj in a way that will increase his utility. This completes 
the informal argument.
This argument shows in an intuitive way why the mechanism works. However, it is not 
a rigorous argument. The main problem is that in general we will not have an interior 
equilibrium in the contribution stage of the game. For arbitrary prices, it will typically 
be in the interest of some of the agents to free ride and contribute zero. However, this 
problem in the above argument can be patched up; there will always be some agent who 
makes a positive contribution to the public good and we only need show that he has an 
incentive to change his behavior if we are not at a Lindahl allocation.
In Varian (1989) I describe a related, but much simpler, mechanism that implements a 
Lindahl allocation in the case of quasilinear utility and two agents. In stage 1 each agent 
announces the rate at which they will subsidize the contributions of the other agent. In 
stage 2 each agent makes a contribution, paying for his own contribution at the subsidized 
rate, and paying the subsidy promised to the other agent. I show that the unique subgame 
perfect equilibrium to this game is the Lindahl allocation. Note that no penalty term is 
required in the case of two agents.
6. The proof that the mechanism works
We make the following assumptions about the agent’s utility functions.
Assumption. The utility function u;(G, Xi) is a differentiable, quasiconcave function that 




is infinite when G — 0.
This assumption ensures that some agent will always want to contribute in the contri­
bution stage, regardless of the prices set by the other agents. It can be relaxed significantly, 





























































































We begin by analyzing the second stage of the game. Given arbitrary prices pi >  0, and 
arbitrary contributions by the other agents, G -i =  agen  ̂ * wants to solve the
problem
max Uj(G_j +gi,X i)
x i i9i
such that Xi +  p,g, =  Wi — piG -i — Q(p)
9i >  0.
In interpreting the budget constraint, remember that each agent must pay an amount that 
depends on the sum of the contributions by the other agents, piG -i, as well as a quadratic 
penalty Q(p) depending on the announced prices.
If we add G -i  to both sides of these constraints and use the definition G =  G -i +  ffi 
we can rewrite this problem as
max Ui(G,Xi)
x i ,G
such that Xi +  p,G =  Wi — Q(p)
G >  G -i.
This is just like a standard two-good consumer maximization problem except for the in­
equality constraint. Although each agent i only gets to choose the level of his contribution 
gi, he is effectively choosing level of the public good, since agent i can choose to contribute 
zero and get G -i  or to contribute a positive amount and get his preferred amount.
Let Gm be the maximum amount of the public good demanded by any of the agents at 
the prices (p,). Then I claim that G„, must be the Nash equilibrium amount of the public 
good. To prove this, simply note that Gm must solve each individual’s utility maximization 
problem.
Note that the pattern of contributions among the agents who prefer to contribute Gm 
is arbitrary. To see this, suppose that agents i and j  want the same amount of the public 
good, Gm, and that they are the only two agents making contributions to the public good. 
Let gi and g3 denote these contributions; of course, gt +  gj =  Gm. However, Vs total 
payment is PiSi +  PiG-i =  p;(<?i +  gj) =  PiGm. Similarly agent j ’s total payment is PjGm.
It follows that any reallocation of the contributions between i and j  does not affect 




























































































This has an important consequence which we will use below. If each individual’s de­
mand for the public good is a differentiable function of the price he faces, then the equi­
librium. amount of the public good will be left-differentiable function of the price faced by 
any contributor.
To see this, observe that there is no difficulty with differentiability when only one agent 
is contributing to the public good. The only difficulties arise when two or more agents each 
contribute. But we have just seen that when two agents contribute, they are indifferent 
about reallocations of the contributions between them— since the amount that they have 
to pay is independent of such reallocations. Suppose that we have an equilibrium in which 
agents i and j  are both contributing. If we increase p, a little bit, then agent i will want 
to stop contributing and free-ride on agent j .  However, agent j  will want to increase his 
contribution by exactly the amount that i was contributing. Hence the same amount of 
the public good will be provided, and the same payments will be made by each agent.
Suppose that we decrease p; a little bit. Then agent i will want to increase his contri­
bution to the public good by a small amount, and agent j  will no longer contribute. Since 
we have assumed that agent i ’s demand for the public good is a differentiable function of 
the price he faces, the equilibrium amount of the public good will only change by a small 
amount.
The price-setting stage
Consider now the price-setting stage of the game. We have already seen that each agent 
naming the Lindahl prices (p?) is a Nash equilibrium.1
So we only need to show that at any price vector other than the Lindahl prices, some 
agent can increase his utility. Let (p*) the the set of prices that result from the announce­
ments (p*j) and let G* be the Nash equilibrium amount of the public good in the second 
stage of the mechanism. We have to investigate three possibles cases.
Case 1. >  1.
1 More precisely, if each agent i names prices pij such that Pij =  Pj, then this is an equi­
librium choice. All that matters is that the numbers p,j named by the agents average out to the Lindahl 




























































































We have seen that at least one agent i must be contributing to the public good. Suppose 
that he changes his for some other agent j  in such a way that the price facing agent j  
decreases by a small amount dpj. This results in some change in the amount of the public 
good in the second stage dG, which may be zero.
The impact of this change on agent i's utility is
, _  9ui,r  ^Ui
d ll i —  o / '-r  dCr .oG oxi p* dG +  2a
dpj.




dG — 2a £ p ï  - 1 ) dPj■
k=l
Since agent i is contributing a positive amount in the contribution stage of the game the 
bracketed expression vanishes, leaving us with
t o duidu{ =  —2a——
OXi £ p î  -  1 ) dpj >  0.
The inequality is due to the fact that dpj is negative and all other terms are positive. 
Hence a small decrease in p* must increase agent i ’s utility.
Case 2. E?=i rf <  !■
Again, let i be an agent who is making a positive contribution, and now let him increase 
agent j ’s price by dpj. Let dG be the associated change in the equilibrium amount of the 
public good. Repeating the argument given for case 1, we are left with
dui =  —2a
dui
dxi
dpj >  0.
Case 3. E t= i Pk =  L
Suppose first that everyone is contributing to the public good in the contribution stage 
of the game. Then the equilibrium amount of the public good, G*, must satisfy the n 
first-order conditions




























































































Summing these conditions gives us
>**) =  !■
But these are the conditions that characterize the Lindahl allocation, in which case were 
are done.
We are left with the case where some agent i is not contributing to the public good. If 
agent i is just on the verge of contributing, so that rn,(G’ , x*) =  p* the argument given 
above applies, so we may assume that m ,(G ",x*) <  p*.
Let agent i choose announcements (pij) such that the price for each agent j  who is 
contributing to the public good increases by a small amount and thus the equilibrium level 




dG ~  ! h ,Pi
dG >  0.
The inequality is due to the fact that the bracketed expression is negative since m;(G*, z *) < 
p* and dG is negative by construction. Hence agent i can increase his utility by such a 
move.
This completes the argument: at any prices other than the Lindahl prices, there is 
some agent i that can increase his utility by naming different prices.
7. Related literature
There is a large literature on mechanisms that “solve the public goods problem.” A 
solution generally means that one can exhibit a mechanism which has Nash equilibria that 
are efficient allocations. This literature up until 1979 is nicely surveyed by Groves (1979).
Clarke (1971) and Groves (1976) examine the public goods problem when all agents 
have quasilinear utility functions and exhibit a mechanism for which the dominant strategy 
of each agent is to report his true valuation of the public good. However, the resulting 
allocation is not in general Pareto efficient.
Groves and Ledyard (1977) present a game whose Nash equilibria are Pareto efficient 




























































































whose Nash equilibria are Lindahl allocations. The Hurwicz (1979) mechanism is in much 
the same spirit as our mechanism in that agents announce “prices” that in equilibrium 
turn out to be Lindahl prices. However, in the Hurwicz mechanism, each agent announces 
his own Lindahl price, not that of the other agents.
Moore and Repullo (1988) describe a mechanism whose subgame perfect equilibria 
implement an arbitrary choice correspondence—including the Lindahl correspondence. 
Moore and Repullo describe their construction in the case of quasilinear preferences, but 
indicate that it can be used for more general preferences.
In the Moore and Repullo mechanism, one agent announces his type and an other agent 
can challenge. If the second agent challenges, then we move to a subgame where agent 1 
must choose between two allocations. The allocations in the subgame are chosen so that 
both agents will have an incentive to be truthful in the announcement and challenge stages.
This scheme has the advantage that it will work in very general environments. However, 
it has the disadvantage that one needs to specify the payoffs in advance for all the possible 
subgames. Although payoffs that satisfy the appropriate conditions will exist under general 
conditions, it may be quite complicated to actually specify them. In our mechanism, by 
contrast, the payoffs Eire very simple to specify.
8. A  general treatment
We now consider a general treatment of the method. Suppose that there are n agents. Let 
x denote an allocation of k goods to the n agents. Each agent has a utility function defined 
over allocations denoted by Uj(x). Since the utility functions axe defined over allocations 
of the goods, each individual’s utility can depend in an arbitrary way on other individuals’ 
consumptions.
Let pi be an nk-vector of personalized prices for agent i. Let x * be an efficient allocation. 
We assume that the allocations x* can be decentralized by a set of personalized prices, p* 



























































































Here uq is agent i ’s initial endowment of goods. This assumption essentially requires that 
preferences be convex.
Given any set of personalized prices (pi), denote the solution to agent i ’s maximization 
problem (3) by x;. Note that x, is an allocation, not a consumption bundle. For simplicity, 
assume that x, is uniquely determined.
For an arbitrary set of personalized prices, the set of proposed allocations will not 
necessarily be feasible. Even if everyone proposes the same feasible alloction, it will not 
necessarily be efficient. Let F(p) denote a measure of how far the allocations fail to 
be feasible, and let E(p) denote a measure of by how much the allocation fails to be 
efficient. These functions should be nonnegative functions that equal zero if and only 
if the allocations are feasible or efficient, respectively, and are positive otherwise. The 
quadratic forms used earlier are a natural choice.
We can now state the appropriate mechanism to solve our resource allocation problem.
Announcement stage. Each agent i announces a personalized price vector ptJ for each 
other agent j .  The price announcements are averaged to construct the personalized prices 
facing agent j  ■
Consumption stage. Each agent chooses x, to maximize his utility, given his personal­
ized prices pi. However, each agent must also pay a penalty of a[E(p) +  .F(p)] where p is 
the vector of all of the personalized prices and a is a strictly positive number.
Once the prices have been determined agent i ’s maximization problem is: 
max u;(x)
X (4)
such that piX <  PiUi -  a[E(p) +  F’(p)].
I claim that the subgame perfect equilibria of this game are efficient allocations.
The proof is a simple variation on the earlier arguments. Let x* be an efficient allo­
cation. Then, by hypothesis, this allocation is supported by a set of personalized prices 
(p*). At the equilibrium set of (p*) the penalty term E(p*) +  F(p*) equals zero. Changing 
his price announcements for the other agents doesn’t affect agent i ’s price, and can only 





























































































Consider any other set of prices that do not minimize E(p) +  F(p). Then some agent 
must have an incentive to adjust his price announcement in a way that decreases the value 
of his penalty term. Hence, no other set of prices can be an equilibrium of the game. This 
completes the argument.
Discussion of the general result
The logic behind the general mechanism is simple: we express our desired allocation as 
the zero of some penalty function, and then give each agent an incentive to minimize that 
penalty function. Stated in this way, the result is trivial. However, as we have seen earlier, 
this general principle can be tailored to specific resource allocation problems in a way that 
makes the mechanism much more useful.
For example, in the case of a simple externality discussed earlier, one firm controls the 
level of the externality directly. In this case there is no problem with feasibility, and we 
only need to ensure that the efficiency condition is met; i.e., that the marginal cost of the 
externality be equated across the firms.
In the case of the public goods problem, we can use the idea of a Lindahl allocation 
to ensure that the feasibility condition is automatically satisfied. I expect that this can 
be done in a large number of cases when the resource allocation problem has sufficient 
structure.
9. Summary
We have exhibited a class of mechanisms that implement efficient outcomes in classical 
environments involving externalities and public goods. Several questions remain for future 
research. Of course, it would be nice to have a mechanism that works when each agent 
only knows his own type. However, it seems unlikely that such a mechanism exists.
First, it would be nice to have a simple mechanism for the public goods case that does 
not require simultaneous moves. Second, it would be nice to find a mechanism that works 
when agents have incomplete information about the types of the other agents. Third, 
it would be useful to examine applications of this method to other problems of resource 
allocation. Finally, it would be very interesting to see how well this mechanism performs 
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